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CHAPTER 11 OF NAFTA AND THE PROVINCES - WILL THE
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION BE ASKED?
Rajeeve Thakur*
I. INTRODUCTION
Canada's unique version of federalism has resulted in an uncertain divi-
sion of powers between federal and provincial governments. International
trade law is among the areas of law that have been significantly impacted by
such uncertainty. An important question that remains unanswered today is
whether the federal government has the constitutional authority to implement
international trade treaties, such as the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment ("NAFTA"), into domestic law so that the treaties will have force
against the whole of Canada (including the provinces). The Labour Conven-
tions Case provides some guidance on this question; but considering its vin-
tage and the facts on which it was based, the answer remains uncertain.'
The recent expropriation of the assets of AbitibiBowater by the Govern-
ment of Newfoundland and Labrador lead AbitibiBowater to launch a dispute
under Chapter 11 of NAFTA. 2 The Government of Newfoundland and Lab-
rador did not make any attempt to settle the dispute under the dispute resolu-
tion process outlined in Chapter 11. Instead, the federal government paid out
a settlement. With the federal government having to pick up the tab in a
NAFTA dispute arising out of purely provincial act, the hand of the federal
government may finally have been forced to take legislative action.
A straightforward approach would be the promulgation of legislation im-
plementing NAFTA into domestic law. To help ensure the provinces will be
held accountable if they violate Chapter 11, the federal government could
also enact a provision, as part of the implementing legislation, stipulating that
provinces will be held liable for such violations. Legislation that implements
NAFTA and imposes liability on provinces for violations thereof, however,
will likely be met with challenges by the provinces. As a result, the Supreme
Court of Canada may have to revisit the Labour Conventions Case and opine
. LL.B., University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law, 2011; J.D., cum laude, Washing-
ton and Lee University School of Law, 2010; Honours B.A., University of Toronto, 2005.
Girls, thank you for your patience and unrelenting support.
1 See Att'y Gen. Can. v. Att'y Gen. Ont. (Labour Conventions), [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673
(P.C.).
2 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, Can
T.S. 1994 No. 2, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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on whether the federal government has the power to implement international
trade treaties into domestic law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Chapter 11 of NAFTA
Chapter 11 of NAFTA deals specifically with investment disputes.3 It has
three primary objectives:
(1)establish a secure investment environment through the elabo-
ration of clear rules of fair treatment of foreign investment and
investors;
(2)remove barriers to investment by eliminating or liberalizing
existing restrictions; and
(3)provide an effective means for the resolution of disputes be-
tween an investor and the host government.4
Structurally, Section A of the chapter provides substantive rules and prin-
ciples, while Section B establishes a dispute settlement mechanism.5 Section
A draws on some of the most common principles of international trade law,
including the principles of "National Treatment"6 and "Most-Favored-Nation
Treatment."7 Two of the most important rules established in Section A are
the rules on "fair and equitable treatment"8 and "expropriation."9
Article 1105(1) states "[e]ach Party shall accord to investments of inves-
tors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, includ-
ing fair and equitable treatment... "i Due to, the lack of detail regarding what
constitutes fair and equitable treatment under Article 1105, a large number of
Chapter 11 claims have been brought, leading to varied interpretation.'I
Unlike Article 1105, Article 1110 provides significant detail on expro-
priation and compensation. It prohibits NAFTA Parties from expropriating
Id.
4 Id. at ch. 11; see also Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter:
Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW. 727 (1993).
NAFTA, supra note 2.
6 Id. at art. 1102.
7 Id. at art. 1103.
8 Id. at art. 1105.
9 Id. at art. Ill 0.
o Id. at art. 1105(1).
See Ian A. Laird, Betrayal, Shock and Outrage - Recent Developments in NAFTA Arti-
cle 1105, 3 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS. & TRADE L. 185, 185-214 (2003).
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the investments of an investor of another NAFTA Party and other measures
tantamount to expropriation. 12 It does, however, offer an exemption from the
prohibition if the expropriation is "(a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-
discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of the law and Arti-
cle 1105(1); and (d) on payment of compensation[.]" 1 3 In paragraphs 2
through 6 of the article, the details of what exactly constitute just compensa-
tion are spelled out. 14 Paragraphs 2 through 6 state the following:
2. Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of
the expropriated investment immediately before the expropria-
tion took place ("date of expropriation"), and shall not reflect any
change in value occurring because the intended expropriation
had become known earlier. Valuation criteria shall include going
concern value, asset value including declared tax value of tangi-
ble property, and other criteria, as appropriate, to determine fair
market value.
3. Compensation shall be paid without delay and be fully realiza-
ble.
4. If payment is made in a G7 currency, compensation shall in-
clude interest at a commercially reasonable rate for that currency
from the date of expropriation until the date of actual payment.
5. If a Party elects to pay in a currency other than a G7 currency,
the amount paid on the date of payment, if converted into a G7
currency at the market rate of exchange prevailing on that date,
shall be no less than if the amount of compensation owed on the
date of expropriation had been converted into that G7 currency at
the market rate of exchange prevailing on that date, and interest
had accrued at a commercially reasonable rate for that G7 cur-
rency from the date of expropriation until the date of payment.
6. On payment, compensation shall be freely transferable as pro-
vided in Article 1109.15
Thus, a NAFTA Party may expropriate the investments of an investor of
another NAFTA Party, as long as it is a proper expropriation under Article
1110(1) and just compensation, as set out in Paragraphs 2 through 6, is paid.
Under Section B, the mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes
between an investor of a NAFTA Party and another NAFTA Party is interna-
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tional arbitration.16 As part of the agreement, each Party has pre-authorized
the submission of disputes to arbitration.' 7 Chapter 11 provides the follow-
ing three avenues for submission of claims: (1) the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") Convention, (2) the Additional
Facility Rules of ICSID, or (3) the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules.18
One of the key characteristics of Chapter 11 is that it gives private inves-
tors the right to bring a claim against a national government of one of the
State Parties to the treaty.' 9 Under its predecessor, the Free-Trade Agree-
ment, a dispute settlement regime for private investors was not available. 2 0
The private cause of action afforded to disgruntled investors under Chapter
11 has also made it one of the most controversial chapters of the agreement.
Given the controversy surrounding this particular part of NAFTA, it may
come as a surprise that both Canada and the United States were intent on
NAFTA providing this type of formal dispute settlement mechanism. 2 1 At
the heart of this controversy is the issue of sovereignty. Many have argued
that bestowing such rights on private parties erodes the sovereignty of state
22parties.
Although the Chapter 11 investment regime is quite comprehensive, it
does permit reservations and exceptions under Article 1108. Article 1108
provides an exemption for provincial governments from having to comply
with Articles 1102, 1103, 1106 and 1107, as long as these governments listed
their non-conforming measures within two years of NAFTA's entry into
force.2 3 As mentioned above, Article 1102, National Treatment, and Article
16 Id. at sec. B.
17 Id. at art. 1122(1).
8 Id. at art. 1120. For NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes, claims may be submitted to arbitration
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. A claim may be submitted to arbitration under the
ICSID Convention if both the disputing Party and the Party the investor's Party are parties to
the Convention. To date, only the United States is a party to the ICSID Convention; Canada
has signed and ratified but has not deposited. ELIZABETH KURUVILA, LIBRARY OF
PARLIAMENT, BILL C-9 SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES ACT (2007).
Mexico has not signed the convention; see CHRISTOPHER H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 222 (1st ed. 2001). If one of the Parties is a party to the Con-
vention, the claim may be submitted under the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID. NAFTA,
supra note 2, at art. 120(b).
19 NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 1116.
20 Free-Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., Jan. 2,1988, 27 I.L.M. 281.
21 See Lawrence L. Herman, Sovereignty Revisited, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 121 (1998); see also
Joseph Cumming & Robert Froehlich, NAFTA Chapter XI and Canada's Environmental Sov-
ereignty, 65 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv 107, 9 (2007) (stating "Canada and Mexico also sup-
ported the inclusion of [investment] provisions").
22 Ray C. Jones, NAFTA Chapter II Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution: A Shield to Be
Embraced or a Sword to Be Feared? 2002 BYU L. REV. 527, 542-46 (2002).
23 NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 1108(2).
254 [Vol. 3 7, No. 1]
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1103, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment are two of the bedrock principles of
international trade law,24 so allowing the provinces to exempt some of their
laws from these principles is significant. None of the provinces formally
provided a list of their non-conforming measures.25 On March 2 9 th, 1996, in
a letter from the Canadian Minister for International Trade to his NAFTA
counterparts, the Canadian Minister provided a general reservation.26
B. Treaty Making in Canada
Part of the controversy that surrounded, and continues to surround, Chap-
ter 11 relates to the general treaty-making process in Canada. Treaty-making
is not specifically addressed in Canada's written constitution. 27 Under the
Constitution Act, 1867, however, the British Crown was given the power to
represent Canada on the international plane; today, the prerogative of the
Crown is exercised by the executive branch of the Canadian federal govern-
ment.28 The treaty-making power lies with the executive: the executive ne-
gotiates, signs, and ratifies international treaties. 2 9 After ratification, states
are subject to the international legal obligation to implement the treaty.30
24 See id.
25 An explanation for the governments of some of the provinces deciding not to provide a
list of their non-conforming laws is that they thought that producing such as list would be seen
as a sign of implicit assent to NAFTA on their part.
26 See Timothy Ross Wilson, Trade Rules: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada (NAFTA Chapter
11) Part II: Are Fears Founded?, 6 NAFTA L. & Bus. REv. AMERICAS. 205, 209 (2000). In
the Trade Rules article Wilson provides the following reproduction of the reservation that was
attached as a schedule in the Minister of International Trade's letter:
Sector: All Sectors Type of Reservation: National Treatment (1102, 1202),
Most-Favored-Nation Treatment (1103, 1203),
Local Presence (1205),
Performance Requirements (1106),
Senior Management and Boards of Directors (1107),
Level of Government: Provincial Measures: All existing non-conforming
measures of all provinces and territories.
Phase-out: None.
27 Joanna Harrington, Redressing the Democratic Deficit in Treaty Law Making, 50
MCGILL L.J. 465 (2005).
28 See Letters Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor General of Canada, 1947, c.
2, reproduced in R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 31 (Can.) (stating the formal delegation of the
King's powers to the Governor General).
29 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., s. 132 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. II,
no. 5 (CAN); see also PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, 11-5, 11.4(a)
(Thompson Reuters Can. Ltd., 5th ed. Supp. vol. 1, 2007); see also LAURA BARNETr,
LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, CANADA'S APPROACH TO THE TREATY-MAKING PROCESS 5 (2008),
available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/prb0845-e.htm (discuss-
ing the power to make treaties generally). Parliament, however, was involved with the ratifica-
tion process in the past; see also Harrington supra note 27, at 476. Recently, the parliamentary
role in ratification has somewhat reemerged; see also Policy on Tabling of Treaties in Parlia-
255
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In Canada, for a treaty that alters domestic law to be enforceable at the
national level, it must be incorporated through domestic law.3' This is dis-
tinct from self-executing or monist regimes where an international treaty
gains national effect by virtue of ratification. Canada's two-step or dualist
treaty implementation regime requires both ratification and domestic imple-
mentation through legislation.32
The level of government-provincial or federal-that must promulgate
the treaty implementing legislation turns on the subject matter of the treaty
itself.33 The Constitution Act, 1867 divides the power to legislate between
the federal government and the governments of the provinces. In the Consti-
tution Act, 1867, section 91 enumerates particular powers that are the respon-
sibility of the federal government, and section 92 enumerates particular pow-
ers which are the responsibility of the governments of the provinces. How-
ever, because of significant overlap and omissions, the division of powers
between the national and sub-national governments is not always clear.
Unlike the United States Constitution, the Canadian Constitution bestows
the federal legislature with the power to preempt the laws of subnational
governments. Article VI, clause 2 (the "Supremacy Clause") of the United
States Constitution states "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Con-
trary notwithstanding." 3 4 The Supremacy Clause has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States to mean that state laws that conflict with
federal law are "without effect."35 The absence of a federal preemption pow-
er in Canada has resulted in considerable frustration in the international trea-
ty-making context, in addition to a variety of other contexts.
The seminal case dealing with the issue of whether the federal govern-
ment has the power to enact legislation that implements a treaty is the Labour
Conventions Case.36 The Labour Conventions Case involved a dispute be-
tween Canada and the provinces over the Canadian government's ability to
promulgate federal legislation that would implement international labour
ment, Gov'T OF CAN., http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/procedures.aspx (last modified Mar. 3,
2011).
30 HOGG, supra note 29.
31 See Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigr.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817,179
(Can.); see also BARNETT, supra note 29, at 5. Some international treaties are consistent with
domestic legislation, and thereby, do not require legislation to be passed. Id.
32 BARNETT, supra note 29.
33 Harrington, supra note 27, at 483.
34 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
3s Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 746 (1981).
36 Att'y Gen. Can. V. Att'y Gen. Ont. (Labour Conventions), [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673 (P.C.).
256 [Vol. 37, N0.1]
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conventions that the Canadian government had ratified. The Canadian
government argued that section 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867 gave it the
necessary power to promulgate such legislation.38 According to section 132,
"[t]he Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all Powers necessary
or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any Province there-
of.. .towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire
and such Foreign Countries."39 Section 132, on its face, seems to provide the
government with necessary powers to implement treaties.
The case was argued before the Supreme Court, resulting in a split deci-
sion. It was then appealed to the Privy Council which held that the Federal
Government's section 132 treaty power does not give it any enhanced subject
matter jurisdiction over and above the jurisdiction it has absent this power.40
Essentially, section 132 has no bearing on the domestic implementation of
international treaties. Much like in domestic matters, the level of govern-
ment that has the power to implement a specific treaty depends on whether
the subject matter of the treaty is within the province of the national or sub-
national government. Determining what level of government has the power
to implement a treaty is difficult in the trade context because the subject mat-
ter of international treaties often falls within the domain of both the federal
and provincial governments. This situation can have far reaching implica-
tions. It could require the legislative approval of up to fourteen govern-
ments4 1 to implement a treaty, thus making treaty implementation a formida-
ble task.
In the case of NAFTA, the task of treaty implementation was not
achieved by Parliament's promulgation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act.4 2 In Canadians v. Canada,4 3 the Ontario
Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether NAFTA had been "incorpo-
rated into domestic law" by the NAFTA Implementation Act. The Court held
that because section 10 of the NAFTA Implementation Act only states "[t]he
Agreement is Hereby Approved," it does not incorporate the treaty into do-
mestic law.M Moreover, no sub-national government in Canada has imple-
mented NAFTA through legislation.45 This regulatory void has resulted in a
37 Id.
38 Id. 15.
39 Constitution Act, supra note 29.
40 See Labour Conventions, I D.L.R. 16.
41 Ten provinces, three territories, and the federal government.
42 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, S.C. 1993, c. 44 (Can.).
43 Council of Canadians v. Canada, (2006) 277 D.L.R. (4th) 527 (Can. Ont.).
4 Id. 25. For a fuller analysis of this decision see HOGG, supra note 29, at 11-7 and
11.4(a).
45 Lawrence L. Herman, C.D. Howe Institute, Trend Spotting: NAFTA Disputes After
Fifteen Years, BACKGROUNDER, July 2010, available at
257
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variety of issues, including whether Canadian sub-national governments are
bound to the provisions of NAFTA. If they are not, who then is liable if an
action is brought against Canada, as a Party to NAFTA, for a sub-national
government's breach of a provision of Chapter 11? Though many commen-
tators foresaw these issues,4 6 the AbitibiBowater settlement has brought them
to the forefront of the Canadian trade law debate.
C. The AbitibiBowater Settlement
AbitibiBowater is one of the largest pulp and paper companies in the
world.4 7 Through its Canadian subsidiaries and their predecessors, AbitibiB-
owater has operated in Canada for more than a century.4 8 Of its operations in
Canada, some of its most significant operations were based in Newfoundland
and Labrador. On December 16th, 2008, the Newfoundland and Labrador
House of Assembly enacted Bill 75 (the "Abitibi-Consolidated Rights and
Assets Act").4 9 The Abitibi-Consolidated Rights and Assets Act expropriated
certain timber rights, land rights, water use rights, and physical assets from
AbitibiBowater.50 Furthermore, the Abitibi-Consolidated Rights and Assets
Act denied AbitibiBowater any form of compensation.5 1
Although AbitibiBowater's head office is in Montreal, it is incorporated
in Delaware. Its United States corporate status allowed it to utilize the Chap-
ter 11 investor dispute settlement process. AbitibiBowater was able to bring
an action against the Canadian government because of its status as an Ameri-
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfim?abstractid=1706256.
46 S.A. Scott, NAFTA, the Canadian Constitution, and the Implementation ofInternational
Trade Agreements, in BEYOND NAFTA: AN ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE 238, 239-42 (A.R. Riggs and T. Velk, eds., 1993). The treaty implementation
issues associated with NAFTA were foreseen by the Federal government even before the
treaty came into force; see DANIEL DUPRAS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT DIVISION, NAFTA:
IMPLEMENTATION AND THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PROVINCES (1993) (Can.), available at
http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp324-e.htm.
47 See AbitibiBowater files for bankruptcy protection, CBC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2009),
http://www.cbc.calcanada/montreal/story/2009/04/16/mtl-abitibi-0416.html.
48 Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North
American Free Trade Agreement AbitibiBowater Inc. v. Government of Canada (Apr. 23,
2009), T 14 [hereinafter AbitibiBowater NOI].
49 An Act to Return to the Crown Certain Rights Relating to Timber and Water Use Vested
in Abitibi-Consolidated and to Expropriate Assets and Lands Associated with the Generation
of Electricity Enabled by Those Water Use Rights, S.N.L. 2008, b. 75 (Can.) [hereinafter
Abitibi-Consoldiated Rights and Assets Act].
50 Id. at ss. 3-8.
5' The Act only left open the possibility of compensation for hydro assets. Id at s. 10(1),
(2). The province also attempted to shield itself from any action resulting from the Act by
inserting a no liability clause within the Act itself. Id. at s. I1.
258 [Vol. 37, No. 1]
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can investor.5 2 Before submitting a claim to arbitration under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA, Article 1118 requires parties to "first attempt to settle a claim
through consultation or negotiation."53 Given the abruptness of the actions of
the government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 54 it came as no surprise that
the province was not willing to negotiate. After the six-month waiting peri-
od,55 AbitibiBowater was free to submit a claim to arbitration. AbitibiB-
owater's counsel submitted a Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to an Arbi-
trator on April 23, 2009,6 and a Notice of Arbitration and Statement of
Claim on February 25, 2010.57
In its Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim, AbitibiBowater
raised a number of claims under Chapter 11. AbitibiBowater argued that the
province directly and unlawfully expropriated its assets, rights, licenses, and
other interests, as none of the criteria for lawful expropriation under Article
1110 were met.58 Moreover, no compensation was provided. AbitibiB-
owater argued that it also did not receive fair and equitable treatment pursu-
ant to Article 1105 because the expropriation "was arbitrary, irrational and
discriminatory, in violation of AbitibiBowater's legitimate expectations of a
stable business and legal environment and of equal treatment vis-a-vis other
investors."59 Finally, it argued that Canada was in breach of the principles of
National Treatment and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment, because by explic-
itly targeting AbitibiBowater, the province directly discriminated against it.60
The corporation claimed monetary damages of $500 million CAD.6'
As some had predicted,62 Canada ended up footing the bill for the actions
of the government of Newfoundland and Labrador.6 3 The federal govern-
52 NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 1101.
53 Id. at art. 1118.
54 The Abitibi-Consolidated Rights and Assets Act was passed in one day, shortly follow-
ing AbitibiBowater's announcement of the closure of the Grand Falls Mill facility in New-
foundland and Labrador. See AbitibiBowater NOI, supra note 48, 42.
s5 Article 1120 of Chapter 11 only permits a claim to be submitted to arbitration six
months after the events given rise to the claim have taken place. NAFTA, supra note 2, at art.
1120.
56 AbitibiBowater NOI, supra note 48.
57 Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Under the Arbitration Rules of the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law and the North American Free Trade Agreement






62 See J. Michael Robinson, Danny's NAFTA Mess, FP Comment, FIN. POST (Jan. 6, 2009),
http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fpcomment/archive/2009/01/06/danny-s-nafta-
mess.aspx; see also Herman, supra note 45, at 6.
63 See Bertrand Marotte, Ottawa Pays AbitibiBowater $130-million for Expropriation,
259
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ment reached a settlement with AbitibiBowater, whereby it paid out $130
million CAD. The significance of the outcome of the AbitibiBowater expro-
priation is that the federal government had to pay one-hundred percent of the
damages associated with the acts of a province in a NAFTA Chapter 11 dis-
pute. Hopefully, this will push Canada to address some of the lingering is-
sues that remain unresolved, over a decade and a half since NAFTA came
into force. After the settlement was reached Prime Minster Stephen Harper
made the following remarks:
I do not intend to get back the monies expended in this case from
the government of Newfoundland and Labrador. But I have indi-
cated that in future, should provincial actions cause significant
legal obligations for the government of Canada, the government
of Canada will create a mechanism so that it can reclaim monies
lost through international trade processes.
The question is -- how will the Prime Minster make good on this prom-
ise?
III. LEGISLATIVE ACTION AND SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Prime Minster Harper's strong tone signals that Canadian provinces will
soon be held accountable for violations of Chapter 11 of NAFTA. A mecha-
nism for reclaiming federal funds lost through the Chapter 11 dispute resolu-
tion process could be created legislatively. As discussed above, the NAFTA
Implementation Act does not appear to bind the provinces to the provisions of
NAFTA. In order to address this issue, Parliament could promulgate legisla-
tion that explicitly implements NAFTA into domestic law. Among the pro-
visions in the implementing statute, Parliament would be well advised to
include a provision that specifically addresses Chapter 11 disputes that arise
out of the conduct of a provincial government. Such a provision should
clearly indicate that any liability resulting to Canada from a Chapter 11 dis-
pute-arising out of the actions of a province-is the responsibility of the
provincial government.
Surely such a provision and the act as a whole would almost certainly be
met with a challenge by the provincial governments. The provincial gov-
ernments would argue that by enacting such legislation, the federal govern-
GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/ottawa-
pays-abitibibowater-130-million-for-expropriation/articlel683906/.
6 See Bertrand Marotte & John Ibbitson, Provinces on the Hook in Future Trade Dis-
putes: Harper, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/provinces-on-hook-in-future-trade-disputes-harper/articlel 686431/.
260 [Vol. 37, No. 1]
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ment has acted beyond its constitutional authority. The Supreme Court of
Canada would then have to decide on the validity of the legislation and likely
revisit the Labour Conventions Case.
The analysis provided below begins with a look at whether legislation
implementing NAFTA as a whole against both the provincial and federal
governments would be upheld by the Supreme Court. Although a variety of
avenues for upholding such legislation may exist, the analysis is limited to
overturning the Labour Conventions Case, as well as distinguishing the La-
bour Conventions Case, the General Trade and Commerce Power of section
91(2), and the Parliament's power to make laws for "peace, order, and good
government."65 Following this analysis, an evaluation of the likelihood of
the Supreme Court upholding a subsidiary provision extending liability to the
provincial governments in Chapter 11 disputes is provided. Finally, the pro-
spect of the federal and provincial governments reaching an understanding is
considered.
A. Implementing NAFTA
(1) Overturning the Labour Conventions Case
Any challenge of legislation implementing NAFTA would require the
Supreme Court to revisit the issues addressed in the Labour Conventions
Case. It is difficult to overlook that at the time this case was decided, Cana-
da was a very different place. Having a single voice to speak to the rest of
the world on international treaties is more important today than ever. It is
also hard to ignore the Supreme Court dicta indicating that the outcome of
the case, if decided today, might be different.66 That being said, it is possible
that the Supreme Court will decide, even today, that the federal government
does not have plenary power to implement international treaties.
(2) Distinguishing the Labour Conventions Case
Even if the Labour Conventions doctrine remains intact, the case could be
distinguished on its facts from a challenge to federal legislation implement-
ing a trade agreement. Arguably, the labour context is different than the
65 See generally CLEMENT MACINTYRE & JOHN WILLIAMS, PEACE, ORDER, AND GOOD
GOVERNMENT (2003) (providing a general overview of how the ideals of peace, order, and
good government drive Canadian policy).
66 See, e.g., Johannesson v. West St. Paul [1952] S.C.R. 292, 303 (Can.); Frances v. The
Queen [1956] S.C.R. 618, 621 (Can.); Re Offshore Mineral Rights of B.C. [1967] S.C.R. 792,
815-17 (Can.); MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, 167-72 (Can.); Schnei-
der v. The Queen [1982] 2 S.C.R. 112, 134-35 (Can.); see also HOGG, supra note 29.
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trade context which could result in a different outcome. The legislation at
the center of the dispute in the Labour Conventions Case dealt with the im-
plementation of international conventions dealing with labour standards. 6 7
The Privy Council stated that the "validity of the legislation can only depend
upon sections 91 and 92 ... [and] this legislation came within the classes of
subjects by section 92 assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the prov-
inces, viz., property and civil rights in the province." 68 A determining factor
in the Privy Council's decision, therefore, was that the legislation in dispute
dealt with a matter clearly within the jurisdiction of the provincial govern-
ments, under section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. The importance of
this factor is made explicit by their reference to their decision in the Refer-
ence re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada ["Radio
Case"].69
In the Radio Case, the Dominion government's power to implement a
treaty regarding radio was upheld.70  The Privy Council distinguished their
decision in the Radio Case on the grounds that the subject matter was the
regulation of radio, which did not fall squarely within one of the enumerated
classes of subjects in section 92 (or section 91).71 Rather, the regulation of
radio could be seen as crossing into both federal and provincial jurisdiction.
Arguably, the case for the regulation of trade, including implementation
of NAFTA, falling within the federal sphere of powers is even stronger than
the regulation of radio. This is because section 91(2) clearly states "Regula-
tion of Trade and Commerce" is within the federal government's exclusive
authority. 72 The provincial governments, on the other hand, would argue that
the subject matter of NAFTA invades the provincial domain of "property and
civil rights," under section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The ques-
Att'y Gen. Can. V. Att'y Gen. Ont. (Labour Conventions), [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673, 1 12
(P.C.).
68 Id. 1 6.
69 Reference re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada (Radio Case),
[1932] AC 304 (Can.).
70 See id
71 The Dominion government made a reference asking whether it had the right to regulate
radio. Id.; see Labour Conventions, I D.L.R. 1 16.
72 Constitution Act, supra note 29. An issue that may arise is that the section 92(1) trade
and commerce power only contemplated domestic trade and commerce, not international trade
and commerce, which was part of the Royal Prerogative at the time. Convincingly, it could be
argued that the federal government's power over trade and commerce has been extended to
international trade and commerce because the federal government now exercises the Crown
Prerogative; see Harrington supra note 27. Significantly, the Supreme Court has recognized
the section 92(1) "the federal trade and commerce power [as] not correspond to the literal
meaning of the words "regulation of trade and commerce' ... [and including] arrangements
with regard to international and interprovincial trade[.]" Canada Attorney General v. Canadi-
an National Transportation Ltd. (Canadian National Transportation Case), [1983] 2 S.C.R.
206, T 33.
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tion of whether the federal government's implementation of NAFTA is held
to be ultra vires may depend, to some extent, on how the subject matter of
the agreement is characterized.
(3) The General Trade and Commerce Power
Under the Labour Conventions doctrine, determining whether federal leg-
islation implementing NAFTA would be upheld may also depend on the
breadth of Parliament's section 91 trade and commerce power. In Citizens
Insurance Co. of Canada v. Parsons, the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council distinguished two branches of federal power under s. 91(2): (1) the
power over international and interprovincial trade and commerce, and (2) the
power over general trade and commerce affecting Canada as a whole ("Gen-
eral Trade and Commerce")."73 The first branch of the commerce and trade
power has been subjected to intense constitutional challenge,7" and is likely
too narrow to be successfully applied to legislation implementing NAFTA.
The second branch, on the other hand, may be sufficiently broad.
To assist in determining if a particular piece of legislation should be up-
held under the General Trade and Commerce Power, the following five-
factor test (the "General Trade and Commerce Power Test") was developed
by the Supreme Court in Vapor and Canadian National Transport:
(i) the impugned legislation must be part of a regulatory
scheme;
(ii) the scheme must be monitored by the continuing over-
sight of a regulatory agency;
(iii) the legislation must be concerned with trade as a whole
rather than with a particular industry;
(iv) the legislation should be of a nature that provinces joint-
ly or severally would be constitutionally incapable of enact-
ing; and
(iv) the failure to include one or more provinces or localities
in a legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful op-
eration of the scheme in other parts of the country.
" Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc. (Kirkbi Case), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302, 15
(Can.)(citing Citizens Insurance Co. of Canada v. Parsons [1881] 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.)); see
also General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd. (General Motors Case),
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, 23 (Can.).
74 General Motors Case, 1 S.C.R. 23; see also Labatt Brewing Co. v. Canada [1980] 1.
S.C.R. 914, 16 (Can.).
7s General Motors Case, I S.C.R. at 662-63; see MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd. [1977]
2 S.C.R. 134, 131-32 (Can.). The Supreme Court of Canada began to construct a test to de-
termine whether legislation enacted under the general trade and commerce power is valid. The
Vapor Court set out the first three factors of the test. The final two were established in 1983;
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This list of factors is not exhaustive and the presence of any or all of the
factors is not decisive, but merely persuasive in determining whether the
legislation falls within the General Trade and Commerce Power. 76 A case-
by-case analysis is necessary.7 In the past, the Supreme Court has used the
General Trade and Commerce Power to uphold federal legislation against
provincial challenge in areas, such as competition7 and intellectual proper-
ty.79
Evaluating legislation that would implement NAFTA into domestic law
under the General Trade and Commerce Power Test set out above would be
difficult as the legislation itself would likely contain little substance of its
own (as its purpose would be to implement NAFTA into domestic law). In
order to perform a meaningful analysis under this test, NAFTA, rather than
the implementing act, must be examined. It is important to note that the Gen-
eral Trade and Commerce Power Test has not been applied in this way by the
Supreme Court in the past. Performing an analysis of the implementing leg-
islation based on NAFTA, however, would still be faithful to the General
Trade and Commerce Power Test because the implementing legislation func-
tions to implement the treaty into domestic law.80 By becoming part of the
domestic law, it is the regime created by the treaty that must be evaluated.
Provided below is an analysis of NAFTA and Chapter 11 under the General
Trade and Commerce Power Test.8
(i) Regulatory scheme
In the General Motors Case,8 2 the Supreme Court considered whether the
Combines Investigation Act was valid under the second branch of the Trade
and Commerce Power. 84 In its examination of whether it contained a regula-
tory scheme, the Supreme Court focused on how the Combines Investigation
Act consisted of a comprehensive regime geared towards achieving the ob-
jective of eliminating activities that reduce competition in the market-place.85
NAFTA can easily be analogized to the Combines Investigation Act. Its pri-
see Canadian National Transportation Case, 2 S.C.R. 34.
76 Id.
78 See generally General Motors Case, 1 S.C.R. at 662-63.
7 See generally Kirkbi Case, 3 S.C.R. at 641.
80 See NAFTA, supra note 2, at Part II.B (explaining treaty implementation generally).
8 See Mark A. Luz, NAFTA, Investment and the Constitution of Canada: Will the Water-
tight Compartments Spring a Leak? 32 OTrAWA L. REv. 35, 59-69 (2000-200 1).
82 General Motors Case, 1 S.C.R. at 662-63.
83 R.S.C. 1952 c. 314. This act was replaced by the Competition Act (R.S.C, 1985, c. C-
General Motors Case, I S.C.R. % 50, 55.
"s See id.T54.
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mary objectives are to eliminate barriers to trade, promote fair competition,
increase investment, and protect and enforce intellectual property rights.86
NAFTA is divided into eight parts, providing detailed and comprehensive
coverage of a variety of areas of trade, including goods, services, government
procurement, investment, intellectual property, labor, and the environment.
As discussed above, Chapter 11 of NAFTA sets out the "rules of the
88
game" in Section A and the dispute resolution mechanism in Section B.
Chapter 11 on its own would likely be considered to encompass a regulatory
regime specifically dealing with the regulation of private investment among
NAFTA countries.
(ii) Regulatory oversight
Turning again to General Motors Case, the Supreme Court found that the
Director of Investigations and Research and the Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission provided sufficient oversight over the regulatory scheme. 9 The
Director has the authority to inquire into suspected anti-competitive conduct
and the Commission holds proceedings. 90 Each of the three parties to
NAFTA is involved in its oversight. The Free Trade Commission consists of
cabinet-level representatives from the three member countries,9 1 and is tasked
with overseeing the implementation and elaboration of the agreement.92 The
NAFTA Co-ordinators are responsible for implementation in a broader
sense.9 3 In addition, each NAFTA Party has a domestic trade body dedicated
to oversight of trade. In Canada, the Department of Foreign Affairs and In-
ternational Trade performs this function. Given the multiple avenues of
oversight, it is likely that this factor is met. The oversight provided by these
bodies extends to all parts of NAFTA, including investment.
(iii) Not focused on a single industry
This factor clearly weighs in favor of NAFTA because the agreement
does not focus on a single industry or sector of the economy. Rather, it seeks
86 See NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 102.
" See generally NAFTA, supra note 2.
88 See NAFTA, supra note 2, at Part II.A (providing more information on the structure of
Chapter 11 ofNAFTA).
89 General Motors Case, I S.C.R. 1 57.
90 Id
91 See Institutions ofNAFTA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INT'L TRADE CAN.,
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-
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to establish a free trade area. 94 Similarly, Chapter 11 focuses on investment
generally and not investment in a specific industry.
(iv) Parliament must promulgate legislation
Although the question of what level of government has the power to im-
plement a specific treaty turns on the subject matter of the treaty, the power
to negotiate, sign, and ratify international treaties is within the powers of the
federal executive.95 In effect, this would make it constitutionally impossible
for the provinces, jointly or severally, to enact NAFTA or Chapter 11 on
their own.
(v) Need for national application
If a single province were not included in NAFTA, it would be extremely
difficult to negotiate such an agreement. It is doubtful that the national gov-
ernments of the United States or Mexico would be willing to enter into a
trade agreement with only some of the Canadian provinces. Even if such an
agreement could be reached, the bargaining power of the provinces that de-
cided to participate would be significantly reduced. In the case of interna-
tional trade, the nation must speak with one voice.
As mentioned above, all five factors do not have to be resolved in favor of
the legislation for the Supreme Court to uphold it under the General Trade
and Commerce Power.96 But finding that all five factors do support a valid
exercise of the General Trade and Commerce Power will be highly persua-
sive. Assuming the validity and acceptance by the Court of the analysis
above, a statute implementing NAIFTA into domestic law would likely come
within the federal government's General Trade and Commerce Power.
Again, it is important to note that to date, the Supreme Court has not extend-
ed this analysis to an international agreement. 97
94 See NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 101.
9 See BARNETT, supra note 28; see also Harrington, supra note 27, at 476.
96 See NAFTA, supra note 2, at Part III.A(3).
9 See Jeffrey Macintosh, The Houdini Gambit, FINANCIAL POST (Nov. 23, 2010)
http://www.financialpost.com/Houdini+gambit/3869790/story.html (analyzing the General
Trade and Commerce Power Test in the Securities Regulation context). See also Memoran-
dum from Ogilvy Renault, to Michael Phelps, Chair, Wise Persons' Committee (Nov. 10,
2003) (on file with author), available at http://www.wise-
averties.ca/reports/WPC%20Research%20Studies.pdf.
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(4) Peace, Order, and Good Government
Under the residual powers of section 91, Parliament may "make Laws for
the Peace, Order, and Good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters
not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to
the Legislatures of the Provinces[.]" 98 The relevant branch to assess the fed-
eral government's enactment of legislation that implements NAFTA domes-
tically is the national concern branch of POGG.99 Justice Le Dain set out the
following test for the national concern doctrine:
(1)the national concern doctrine is separate and distinct from
the national emergency doctrine...
(2)it applies to new matters which did not exist at confedera-
tion and matters which since became matters of national
concern;
(3)it must have a singleness, distinctiveness, and indivisibil-
ity that distinguishes it from local matters and its impact on
provincial jurisdiction is reconcilable with the distribution of
constitutional power; and
(4)in determining 3, what would the effect of provincial fail-
ure to effectively deal with the regulation of the matter on
extra provincial interests.'00
There is also a national emergency branch of POGG. This branch is not
relevant in this context as it is unlikely that the implementation of a trade
agreement would be considered necessary temporary legislation, so the first
prong of the test is irrelevant. Arguably, the second prong of the test would
also be satisfied. Trade agreements, such as NAFTA, did not exist with the
Dominion at Confederation and are matters of national concern. In Canadi-
an Generic Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Canada (Minister ofHealth), the Feder-
al Court stated in dicta that NAFTA would satisfy this prong.'o
Under the third prong, the test for singleness, distinctiveness and indivisi-
bility has been described as demanding because of the risk that the notion of
national concern poses to the constitutional division of provincial and federal
powers. 102 The analysis under the third prong is informed by the fourth
prong. The effect on extra-provincial interests of a provincial failure to deal
98 Constitution Act, supra note 29, § 91.
9 See R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, 402-03 (Can.); R v. Hy-
dro-Quebec [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 64-65 (Can.).
100 Id.
101 Can. Generic Pharm. Ass'n v. Can. Minister of Health [2009] F.C.J. No. 938 (Can.).
102 R v. Hydro-Quebec, 3 S.C.R. 1 67.
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effectively with the control or regulation of the intra-provincial aspects of
trade could be significant, as roughly half of provincial exports are to mar-
kets within Canada. 0 3 Regulation of trade among the provinces and the reg-
ulation of trade among the provinces and other countries may be divisible,
leaving the former within the authority of the provinces and the latter within
the authority of the federal government.
Turning solely to international trade, there would still be some encroach-
ment on the section 92(13) provincial powers if the regulation of internation-
al trade agreements was left to Parliament. The indivisible nature of interna-
tional trade, however, would make it difficult to argue that both the federal
and provincial governments could regulate such trade. The actions of one
province can impact the whole nation. For example, if the federal govern-
ment did not pay AbitibiBowater for the actions of the government of New-
foundland and Labrador, the impact would have been felt across Canada.
Not paying out any compensation for such a blatant and large-scale expropri-
ation would result in a negative impact on foreign investment in Canada.
Notwithstanding this analysis, the limited precedent on what qualifies under
the national concern branch of the POGG makes it is difficult to determine
whether federal legislation that implements NAFTA would be upheld under
this branch.
Though it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will overturn the Labour
Conventions doctrine, it may determine that international trade is outside the
reach of the doctrine. As explained above, the national concern branch of the
POGG may also be an avenue for upholding federal regulation implementing
NAFTA. The General Trade and Commerce Power, however, would likely
be the strongest grounds for finding such legislation is valid, provided the
Supreme Court finds the General Trade and Commerce Test to be applicable
in this context. Analyzing the factors, it appears that they weigh in favor of
NAFTA and Chapter 11. Unfortunately, even if a Supreme Court decision
finds that the provinces are bound to the provisions of NAFTA, it may not
solve the problem that arose in the AbitibiBowater dispute. This is because
Chapter 11 is silent on the issue of provincial liability under Articles 1105
and 1110. For this reason, a more direct approach may be necessary.
B. A Provincial Liability Provision
A provision that holds a provincial government responsible for liability
resulting from Chapter 11 disputes that arise out of its conduct is necessary.
Even if an act implementing NAFTA was found to be intra vires, the provin-
cial governments may challenge a particular provision of the act. Again, the
103 STATISTICS CAN., GovT. OF CAN., DEPOSITORY SERVICE PROGRAM, INTERPROVINCIAL
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN CANADA 1992-1998 (2000).
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strongest argument that Parliament has the authority to enact such a provision
is that it falls within the General Trade and Commerce Power. The test for
determining whether a provision within an act, rather than the act as a whole,
is valid was articulated in the General Motors Case;1 the steps of the test
are as follows:
(1)[T]he court must determine whether the impugned provi-
sion can be viewed as intruding on provincial powers, and if
so to what extent[.]
(2)[T]he court must establish whether the act (or a severable
part of it) is valid[.]
(3)If so, the court must then determine whether the im-
pugned provision is sufficiently integrated with the scheme
that it can be upheld by virtue of that relationship.105
At the first stage of the analysis, the reviewing court examines the provi-
sion individually, without regard to the Act of which it is part.106 On its own,
a provincial liability provision is sure to be seen as intruding on provincial
powers. Take the AbitibiBowater settlement, for instance; the government of
Newfoundland and Labrador promulgated provincial legislation that expro-
priated the property of a private company. Given that the matter was civil in
nature and all the property was located within the province, the enactment of
Bill 75 seems to fall within section 92(13). Federal legislation requiring the
provincial government to make payment to AbitibiBowater as a result of
such action seems to intrude on the provinces authority. A reviewing court's
finding that the provision invades the provincial legislative domain, however,
would not necessarily result in the provision being invalidated. 107
The second stage requires the court to determine whether the act, or a
severable part of it, is valid.108 When examining the validity of a provision
under the General Trade and Commerce Power, an analysis of the factors in
the General Trade and Commerce Power Test is necessary.109 As discussed
above, if the five factors are applied to NAFTA, or Chapter 11 on its own,
they will likely all weigh in its favor." 0
Finally, the provision must be sufficiently linked to the legislation."' In
the Vapor Case, Chief Justice Laskin indicated that including an invalid pro-
' See General Motors Case, 1 S.C.R. 47.
105 Id.




10 See NAFTA, supra note 2, at Part III.A.(3).
1 See General Motors Case, 1 S.C.R. 44.
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vision in a valid act does not make the provision valid.1 2 At this stage in the
analysis, the degree to which the provision encroaches on the provincial
power is relevant." 3 A sliding scale approach is taken. The more intrusive
the legislation is on the provincial power the stronger the connection between
it and the act must be.1 4 In the case of legislation that holds the provinces
liable if their actions result in liability under Chapter 11, the strength of the
connection between the provision and Chapter 11 of NAFTA is unquestiona-
ble. Without a mechanism to hold the provincial governments liable for vio-
lating Chapter 11, the entire Chapter 11 framework is at risk. As in the Abit-
ibiBowater scenario, provincial governments could contravene the provisions
of the Chapter and the federal government would be liable for their actions.
This could circumvent the objectives of the Chapter-establishment of a
secure investment environment, removal of investment barriers, and effective
dispute resolution throughout the country."'5 The analysis of a provincial
liability provision under the General Motors framework shows that a review-
ing court would likely find such a provision valid.
C. An Understanding
As an alternative to legislative action, the federal and provincial govern-
ments could negotiate an agreement. Given that maintaining a stable trade
relationship with the United States and Mexico is in the best interests of Can-
ada as a whole, an understanding with the federal government may be a via-
ble option. It would also allow both levels of government to avoid a major
constitutional issue. Since the Labour Conventions Case was decided, and
perhaps even before then, the provincial and federal governments have, at
least in some cases, co-operated in making treaties. The AbitibiBowater set-
tlement is significant because the federal government paid one-hundred per-
cent of the proceeds of a Chapter 11 settlement that stemmed from acts that
were exclusively provincial. As prominent trade law practitioner Lawrence
Herman points out: "consideration should be given to a federal-provincial
understanding or protocol settling responsibility for payment of NAFTA
awards that concern provincial measures.""' 6 Given what is at stake and Ca-




"5 See NAFTA, supra note 2, at ch. 11.
116 Herman, supra note 45, at 6.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Parliament's promulgation of an act implementing NAFTA into Canadian
domestic law and insertion of a provision that apportions liability for Chapter
11 disputes could prevent the reoccurrence of the AbitibiBowater problem.
This, of course, is not the only way the federal government could remedy the
problem. Any legislative solution that implements NAFTA domestically,
however, will likely be subjected to the scrutiny of the Supreme Court upon
provincial objections. In an effort to temper its actions, prior to promulgat-
ing such legislation, Parliament could pose the question of whether it has the
authority to enact such legislation to the Supreme Court by submitting a ref-
erence. Whether by a reference or a provincial ultra vires challenge to legis-
lation, the Supreme Court of Canada would have to decide on the constitu-
tional validity of the legislation.
Though it is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court would approach
this constitutional question, the General Trade and Commerce Power likely
provides the strongest basis for domestically implementing NAFTA and a
related provincial liability provision. Such a decision would require the Su-
preme Court to widen the scope of the General Trade and Commerce Test to
include legislation that implements an international agreement, and look to
the agreement to satisfy the factors of the test. This is the only way to per-
form a meaningful analysis. Given the importance and timeliness of this
issue, 117 it is likely that Prime Minster Harper will fulfill his promise and the
Supreme Court may soon be confronted with this question.
As discussed above, a constitutional challenge may be avoided if a feder-
al-provincial understanding is reached. In any case, implementing NAFTA
against all of Canada and enacting a provision that clearly establishes provin-
cial liability or by negotiating an understanding that has essentially the same
effect will insure that the federal government does not have to pay for pro-
vincial acts that violate Chapter 11. As result of a resolution on this issue,
the provinces would be motivated to get involved in the entire Chapter 11
117 More cases involving the actions of provinces that contravene Canada's obligations
under international trade treaties are making their way through the pipeline. See eg., Notice of
Arbitration Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dow Agrosciences LLC, Investor v. Gov't of Can. (Mar. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/DowAgroSciencesLLC-2.pdf (involving losses to Dow Agroscienc-
es allegedly caused by a Quebec ban on sale of law pesticides). See also Canada - Certain
Measures Affection the Renewable Energy Generation Sector WT/DS412 (Panel com-
posed on Oct. 6, 2011), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/cases e/ds4l2 e.htm (involving a challenge by
Japan later joined by the EU and the U.S., alleging the made-in-Ontario requirements of its
feed-in-tariff program violates Canadian obligations under the GATT because, among other
violation, they act as a subsidy).
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dispute settlement process for conflicts that originate out of provincial
measures. This motivation would stem from the fear of resulting liability for
an award against Canada. This is important because currently Canada is not
only "on the hook" for payment of awards and settlements, it also must ex-
pend resources on the arbitration process. If a Chapter 11 dispute arises from
the acts of a province, the province will likely be better situated to defend
such actions. Moreover, the provinces and territories may think twice before
enacting measures that would violate the provisions of Chapter 11 if they
could no longer rely on the federal government to "pick up the check." This
would help contribute to a stable investment environment and repair any
damage done to Canada's reputation as a safe place for foreign investment.
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EDITOR-IN-CHIEF'S NOTE
Volume Thirty-Seven, Number Two of the Canada- United States Law
Journal contains articles written by academics, professionals, and students
regarding the Beyond the Border Initiative proposed by U.S. President Barack
Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper on February 4, 2011. The
Journa's umbrella organization, the Canada- United States Law Institute, held its
annual conference on this initiative on March 22-23, 2012. The articles featured in
this issue reflect the varying ideologies presented at the conference and related to
this important endeavor. This issue showcases some of the brightest and
influential minds in the field. The Journal extends a sincere thank you to the
contributing authors for their insightful and exceptional scholarship and for their
essential voice in this discourse.
This volume could not have been accomplished without the guidance and
leadership exhibited by its faculty advisors. First, the Journal extends a warm
thank you to its Case Western-based faculty advisor, David Kocan. David has
been very supportive of the Journal and the new direction it has taken. His open-
door policy and assistance throughout the process was key to this issue's successful
publication. The Journal also wishes to thank Chios Carmody, whom albeit on
sabbatical, provided continued support and enthusiasm to the University of
Western Ontario Faculty of Law editorial staff.
We must also thank our editorial staff members for their hard work. The
Executive and Associate Editors have worked diligently for months editing,
finding strong supporting authorities, and footnoting. These are time-consuming,
often frustrating, tasks and each editor has performed admirably. The Journal
could not be published without the tireless work of these staff members.
Special thanks are also due to the Articles Editor, Kelsey Marand, and
the Publication Editor, Stuart Sparker. Each went well beyond their "call of duty"
and their help, humor, and contribution to this issue must be noted. Likewise,
Scott Robinson, the Canadian Managing Editor, was invaluable at Western
Ontario and successfully expanded the Western staffs involvement in the
Journals publications. Without Scott's hard work and dedication to the Journal, I
doubt its bi-national nature could have continued.
Additionally, the Journal would like to acknowledge our research
librarian, Andrew Dorchak. He is truly a research genius and our staff would be
lost without him.
Lastly, and with my biggest thank you of all, I would like to recognize
the Managing Editor, Tyler Talbert. Tyler has provided continued support
throughout this entire process. His willingness to assume added duties despite his
many other non-Journal related responsibilities is much appreciated. Tyler, thank
you for not just being an awesome Managing Editor, but a great friend.
The Journal staff would also like to thank our family and friends for their
support and patience during the publication process. We cannot imagine
completing this issue without their encouragement and understanding.
On behalf of the entire Canada-United States Law Journal, we appreciate
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